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D rawing on behavioral research, we construct a multi-period model with which to examine the role of trust and othersocial characteristics in a supply chain. Specifically, we focus on trust building in the context of a salesperson who
acts as a representative of a manufacturer and shares demand forecast information with a retailer. The actions of the sales-
person affect both her immediate economic gain and her future credibility as determined by retailer’s trust. Our analysis
reveals that, in such environments, although salespersons of widely varying types (e.g., honest, self-serving, benevolent,
loyal) lie some extent about their forecast information, they tend to be trusted in long relationships, provided their fore-
casting accuracy is higher than that of the retailer. Furthermore, while the presence of a salesperson can improve the prof-
its of both the retailer and manufacturer, there are cost structures under which the manufacturer is better off without a
salesperson. Finally, we make the general observation that the appropriate salesperson compensation scheme depends on
her social characteristics, and the specific observation that when the salesperson cares for the retailer, the linear compensa-
tion scheme commonly suggested in the literature as the optimal compensation scheme for the salesperson is no longer
optimal.
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1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, supply chain management has been
the subject of considerable research attention. A major
focus of this research has been on how to eliminate
inefficiencies in the supply chain by coordinating the
decisions of suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers.
Various forms of contracts and incentives have been
proposed for improving supply chain coordination
and information sharing (Tsay and Agrawal 2004).
However, recent experimental work has found that
supply chain members tend to deviate from the opti-
mal decisions suggested by the literature (Bendoly
et al. 2006). This suggests that there is something
more to supply chain relationships than mere eco-
nomic coordination. In this article, we suggest that
supply chain (or indeed any business) relationships
also depend on non-pecuniary issues such as trust
and social characteristics.
Non-pecuniary issues are important because,
although they cannot be measured and contracted on,
they affect businesses. For example, Uzzi (1996)
showed in a longitudinal empirical study of supplier–
manufacturer relationships in the apparel industry
that economic exchange over time becomes rooted in
complex relationships that involve economic invest-
ment, friendship, and altruistic attachments. Fur-
thermore, there is overwhelming evidence of the
importance and impact of successful relationships in
business decisions (Anderson and Coughlan 2002).
The main question we seek to study in this article is
how the non-pecuniary issues of social characteristics
and trust between the salesperson and retailer affect
the performance of a supply chain.
A specific supply chain activity in which trust and
social characteristics are important is forecast infor-
mation sharing. Although it is well known that
forecast sharing can lead to uninformative communi-
cation if the incentives of the firms who share their
forecast are too different (see Crawford and Sobel
[1982] for a game theoretic analysis), there are many
situations where collaborative forecasting can
improve performance. For example, in a field study of
a major automotive manufacturer (see Hopp et al.
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[2010] for details) we found that the dealer and the
salesperson (who serves as the representative of the
manufacturer) willingly share their forecasts of
demand despite the lack of any explicit contract
about information sharing. However, almost all of
the salespersons we interviewed indicated that the
key to success was a trusting and mutually beneficial
relationship with the dealers. In this article, we spe-
cifically examine the role that trust, length of relation-
ship, and social characteristics of the salesperson and
the retailer play in this forecast information sharing
mechanism.
Drawing on behaviorial research into the composi-
tion and development of trust, we construct a multi-
period model with which to examine the evolution of
trust and its impact on the sharing of demand forecast
information between a salesperson (for a manufac-
turer) and a retailer (dealer). In our discrete time
model, the retailer and the salesperson make demand
forecasts in each period. Depending on the environ-
ment, the salesperson’s forecast may be more or less
accurate on average than the retailer’s. Once the fore-
casts are made, the salesperson recommends that the
retailer purchases a specific quantity from the manu-
facturer. With the salesperson’s recommendation, as
well as his own forecast of demand, the retailer selects
his order quantity and places an order. The order is
filled, demand is realized, and the process repeats.
In our model, we assume that the retailer does
not know the accuracy of the salesperson’s demand
forecast except through experience. Furthermore,
depending on the personality and social characteris-
tics of the salesperson, the salesperson may have dif-
ferent intentions when she recommends an order
quantity to the retailer. For example, the salesperson
could be concerned only about her compensation, she
could also be concerned about the profits to the man-
ufacturer, or she could be concerned about the profits
of the retailer as well. The motives and interpersonal
skills of the salesperson, and the social characteristics
of the retailer, will influence the extent to which the
salesperson is able to gain the trust of the retailer. In
our model, the retailer receives recommended order
quantities from the salesperson in each period.
Because the salesperson’s recommendations cannot
be taken as objective, the retailer must decide to what
extent he should trust the salesperson. The retailer’s
degree of trust in the salesperson influences the
weight he gives to the salesperson’s recommendation.
Then, after observing the realized demand at the end
of each period, the retailer updates his trust in the
salesperson. How this is done depends on social char-
acteristics of the retailer. For example, he may be
trusting, and gain trust in the salesperson quickly, or
he may be skeptical, and be very slow to build trust in
the salesperson. In this article, we study how trust
and social characteristics of the retailer can influence
profits in a supply chain. We also examine whether
the retailer’s skepticism has any effect on the effec-
tiveness of a salesperson and the conditions under
which retailer trust in salespersons is strong enough
to allow the salesperson’s more accurate forecast to
improve supply chain profits.
We also consider the social characteristics of the
salesperson by studying various types of salesper-
sons. First, as benchmarks for comparison, we con-
sider a benevolent salesperson, who seeks to maximize
the retailer’s profit, and an honest salesperson, who
always tells the truth. Second, to capture reality, we
consider several variations of the self-serving sales-
person, who maximizes her own utility. Within the
self-serving category, we consider different social
characteristics: (i) someone who cares only for her
own profit, whom we call a selfish salesperson; (ii)
someone who also considers gain and loss of the man-
ufacturer while maximizing her own payoff, whom
we call a loyal salesperson; (iii) someone who also con-
siders the retailer’s gain and loss while maximizing
her own payoff, whom we call a compassionate sales-
person; and (iv) someone who considers both the
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s gain and loss while
maximizing her own payoff, whom we call a fair
salesperson. By examining the behavior of the supply
chain with these different types of salesperson, we
seek to understand how the social characteristics of
the salesperson impacts supply chain performance. In
particular, we examine what types of salespersons are
beneficial to both the retailer and the manufacturer,
and whether a benevolent salesperson whose concern
is to increase the retailer’s profit.
When salespersons are self-serving, as we expect
them to be in many environments, salesperson com-
pensation becomes important. We consider two com-
mon compensation schemes that are used in practice,
namely (i) a simple linear compensation scheme and
(ii) a commission-plus-bonus scheme. The simple
linear commission compensation scheme has been
shown to be the optimal contract form for a broad
range of circumstances provided that the salesperson
is risk-neutral (McAfee and McMillan 1987).1 We seek
to understand how trust and social characteristics
interact with salesperson compensation to influence
the performance of the supply chain. Specifically, we
study how the behavior of the different types of sales-
person is impacted by the compensation scheme, and
how manufacturers should pay different types of
salespersons to maximize profits.
As one would expect, we find that a self-serving
salesperson tends to inflate her forecast to manipulate
retailer orders. However, becausemanipulative behav-
ior leads to a degradation of trust, even a self-serving
salesperson has incentive to moderate her behavior
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toward honesty. Our results show that to gain and
maintain trust of the retailer, the salesperson some-
times deflates her forecast and sacrifices current pay-
off. Furthermore, we find that while the benevolent
salesperson is more trusted by the retailer than the
other types of salespersons, she nevertheless tells
occasional “white lies” that are meant to correct flaws
in the retailer’s forecasts. While all salespersons, other
than the honest salesperson benchmark, tend to lie,
we find that a salesperson whose forecasting accuracy
is worse than that of the retailer tends to lie more than
a salesperson whose forecasting accuracy is better
than that of the retailer. The reason is that a sales-
person with poor forecasting accuracy has a very hard
time maintaining the trust of the retailer, or gaining it
back once she loses it. Therefore, to have any influ-
ence at all, a low accuracy salesperson must do what-
ever she can to gain the trust of the retailer, including
recommending orders that are close to her forecast of
demand rather than what she thinks are optimal for
the retailer. That is, she lies to gain trust of the retailer.
Finally, while the retailer is better off trusting a sales-
person he knows is benevolent or honest, the retailer
is always better off being skeptical when the sales-
person is self-serving (even when the self-serving
salesperson is compassionate).
In game theoretic studies of a single interaction
between the parties in a supply chain, researchers
have shown that when the parties have conflicting
goals, they rarely share information (see, e.g., Ozer
et al. 2011). By contrast our evolutionary model of
ongoing relationships where trust is a factor shows
that salespersons with good forecasting accuracy tend
to be highly trusted by the retailer (i.e., information is
shared), even when the salespersons have self-serving
motives. Such salespersons can improve the profit of
both the retailer and the manufacturer, although this
depends on the cost structure of the supply chain and
the social characteristics of both the retailer and the
salesperson. We also find that the retailer only trusts a
salesperson who has better forecasting accuracy than
himself. A long salesperson–retailer relationship
improves the extent to which trust reflects the sales-
person’s forecast accuracy, and thus the retailer bene-
fits from longer relationships.
Finally, the salesperson compensation scheme
impacts supply chain performance, but the manner
in which this occurs depends on the trust and
social characteristics involved. We find that a sales-
person with a simple commission-based compensa-
tion scheme is more trusted than a salesperson with
a combination of commission-based and bonus com-
pensation schemes but, interestingly, the latter com-
pensation scheme generates more profit for the
manufacturer when the salesperson is compassion-
ate (i.e., cares for retailer’s profit). This implies that
the simple linear compensation scheme, which has
been widely reported in the literature to be optimal,
is no longer optimal when the social relationship
between the salesperson and the retailer is taken into
consideration.
2. Literature Review
In this article, we focus on the role trust plays in infor-
mation sharing within a supply chain. Hence, we first
review work on the effects of information in supply
chain coordination. Then, we review general defini-
tions of trust and its role in various business relation-
ships. Next, we discuss empirical and analytical
results specifically on trust in supply chains. We also
review the related literature on behavioral economics
and marketing on social preferences.
Information sharing between supply chain mem-
bers has been shown to be beneficial to both indi-
vidual members and overall system performance.
Cachon and Fisher (2000) showed that combining the
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s forecasts improves
the flow of goods in supply chain. Aviv (2001) com-
pared a “local forecasting” supply chain, in which
the manufacturer and the retailer maintain separate
forecasts, with a “collaborative forecasting” supply
chain, in which the manufacturer and the retailer
join their forecasting efforts. He showed that “collab-
orative forecasting” tends to be superior to “local
forecasting” because of benefits from diversification
of forecasting capabilities. For a detailed literature
review of information sharing in supply chains, see
Chen (2003).
The concept of trust has been explored by research-
ers across different disciplines, including economics,
psychology, and sociology. One of the earliest stud-
ies of trust in interpersonal relationships was by
Mellinger (1956). Mellinger defined trust as an indi-
vidual’s confidence in another person’s intentions,
motives, and sincerity of speech. In the past few dec-
ades, researchers have proposed various definitions
of trust, consisting of one or more of the following
three attributes: (i) benevolence (care for the well-
being of the other party), (ii) integrity (honesty in
words and actions), and (iii) competence (ability
and creditability) (Larzelere and Huston, 1980). For
additional discussions and definitions of trust; see
Rousseau et al. (1998).
Many experimental and field research studies have
examined the effect of trust in business relationships.
In the context of negotiation, trust between the nego-
tiating parties has been shown to facilitate informa-
tion sharing (Thompson 1991), reduce uncertainty
(Kollock 1994), and increase cooperation (Mayer et al.
1995). Carnevale and Isen (1986) suggested that trust
leads to more efficient negotiated agreements because
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it induces reciprocity. Within an organization, trust
has been shown to be effective in increasing employee
cooperation (Smith et al. 1995). In buyer–seller rela-
tionships, studies have suggested that trust increases
opportunities for future sales (Crosby et al. 1990) and
is fundamental for conflict resolution and sustainable
buyer–seller relationships (Ganesan 1994). Trust has
also been shown to act as a substitute for legally bind-
ing contracts (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995).
Recently, economists have used trust games to
examine the role of trust in investment decisions. Berg
et al. (1995) studied a single round trust game in
which player A decides how much of the show-up fee
to send to an anonymous counterpart player B. The
amount of money triples when it is passed. Player B
then decides if and how much money to return to
player A. The authors found that, in contradiction to
the non-cooperation prediction of game theory, player
A tends to send money to player B. The authors attri-
bute this trusting behavior to the participants’ belief
that it is human nature to reciprocate. Moreover, the
authors found that the likelihood of player B to recip-
rocate player A’s trusting behavior increases when
information on social history (e.g., results on how
other individuals behaved in past experiments) is
provided.
A number of investment trust games have been
derived from the work of Berg et al. (1995). Glaeser
et al. (2000) combined trust game experiments with
surveys and found that individuals who are closer
socially exhibit more trust and trustworthiness behav-
ior. Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004) extended that
study to a multi-stage game where the time horizon
can be definite or indefinite. They found that, with
inexperienced subjects, the level of trust was the
same in the definite and indefinite settings. However,
trust in the definite time horizon setting decreases as
subjects gain experience in the game. Lastly, Bohnet
and Zeckhauser (2004) compared a trust game with a
probabilistic decision process. They found that,
because of averseness to betrayal, individuals were
more willing to take investment risks when the out-
come is due to pure chance than when it depends on
another player’s trustworthiness.
Only recently has research in operations manage-
ment begun to study the effect of trust. Most of this
work has been empirical. For example, surveys of
supply chain parties have suggested that building
trust improves supply chain responsiveness to mar-
ket changes (Handfield and Bechtel 2002) and
induces cooperation among supply chain members
(Terwiesch et al. 2005).
Although analytical work on trust is uncommon,
some has been done. For example, Ren et al. (2010)
considered a supply chain whose buyer shares his
demand forecast with a supplier to facilitate the
supplier’s decisions in building manufacturing capac-
ity. While the buyer has incentive to inflate the
demand forecast in an attempt to ensure future sup-
ply, the supplier may respond by under-investing in
capacity. The authors showed that, if the relationship
is long term, it is optimal for the buyer to report the
true forecast to the supplier in order to gain the sup-
plier’s trust. Taylor and Plambeck (2007) considered a
similar model in which the buyer and supplier have
an informal agreement on required capacity. They
concluded that the buyer will honor such an agree-
ment because of the future value of cooperation. In
both of these models, trust is defined as perceived
credibility and is considered to be binary. The trustor
either trusts and cooperates, or distrusts and refuses
to cooperate.
Our definition of trust differs from previous supply
chain models in that: (i) we consider trust on a contin-
uum, with extremes representing complete trust and
complete distrust (as proposed in the work of Tardy
1988, Lewicki and Bunker 1995); and (ii) trustworthi-
ness is not only a measure of creditability but also a
reflection of competence and social characteristics.
Our model also differs from previous work by consid-
ering a supply chain with sufficient capacity in which
retailer (buyer) and salesperson (representative of the
seller) make demand forecasts which may be used by
the retailer to make ordering decisions.
A number of papers in behaviorial economics argue
that people do not necessarily maximize their own
profits when dealing with other people. For example,
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) showed via empirical
analysis that people are motivated by both their pecu-
niary payoff and their relative payoff standing. That
is, people care about fairness of the outcomes. Also,
Rabin (1993) developed the concept of fairness equi-
librium, based on the premise that people like to help
those who help them, and hurt those who hurt them.
Levine (1998) classified people as being, to various
degrees, spiteful or altruistic. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
argued that there are many examples indicating that
people are more cooperative than is assumed in the
standard self-interest model and there are also con-
trary pieces of evidence indicating that virtually all
people behave as if completely selfish. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) showed that if some people care about
equity this puzzling evidence can be resolved and
that the economic environment determines whether
the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilib-
rium behavior. This finding bolsters our assumption
of the possibility of non-selfish types of salespersons.
In a similar vein, the paper by Charness and Rabin
(2002) introduced a model in which people care about
others’ payoff by sacrificing own payoff; specifically
they sacrifice for people with low payoffs and they
punish unfair players. Additional discussion of
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non-selfish behavior can be found in Ho et al. (2006),
which reviewed six behavioral economics models that
are useful to marketing. In particular, Cui et al. (2007)
incorporated the concept of fairness in a conventional
dynamic channel to investigate how fairness may
affect channel coordination. They showed that when
channel members are concerned about fairness, the
manufacturer can use a simple wholesale price con-
tract to achieve maximum channel profit. Inspired
by these behaviorial models, we define a utility
function for the salesperson that incorporates social
preferences.
The research most closely related to our work is
Ozer et al. (2011). They investigated the capacity
investment problem of a supplier who solicits private
forecast information from a manufacturer. To ensure
abundant supply, the manufacturer has incentive to
inflate her forecast in a costless, non-binding, and non-
verifiable type of communication. They conducted a
controlled laboratory experiment and determined
that, even with a single interaction, the supplier trusts
the manufacturer to some extent, which is in contrast
with predictions from the analytical game theoretic
approach. They also developed a model of trust to
incorporate both pecuniary and non-pecuniary incen-
tives and showed that their model fits data from their
behavioral experiments. They suggested that the sup-
plier does not use Bayes’ rule to update his belief
about demand but instead makes use of a linear com-
bination of his own (conditional) prior and what the
manufacture reports as her private signal. In our
model, we use similar model of trust to explain the
behavior of the retailer. However, unlike Ozer et al.
(2011), we also propose a trust updating mechanism
that is used to model how trust is built up over time.
Our work differs from previous work of informa-
tion sharing in supply chains in that we have incorpo-
rated the concept of social characteristics and trust
into the supply chain dynamics. Figure 1 depicts this
difference by contrasting a typical model from the
literature (e.g., Ebrahim-Khanjari et al. 2011) on the
left and the model we study in this article on the right.
In this article, we show that introduction of social
characteristics and trust into the supply chain model
impacts the influence of a salesperson, as well as the
effectiveness of the salesperson compensation scheme.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.
In section 3, we develop our model. In section 4, we
study the optimal order recommendation strategy of
different types of salespersons. Section 5 presents our
numerical experiments; in section 5.2 we study the
case in which the retailer has worse forecasting accu-
racy than the salesperson; and in section 5.3, we con-
sider the case where the retailer has better forecasting
accuracy than the salesperson. In these two sections,
we examine the impact of the social characteristics of
trust, skepticism, and truthfulness on supply chain
performance. Finally, we summarize our insights into
the role of trust in supply chains and suggest future
research directions in section 6.
3. Trust Building in Forecast Sharing
To provide a rigorous framework for examining the
role of trust in a supply chain, we use a discrete-
time model with a manufacturer, a retailer, and a
wholesale salesperson, who is hired by the manu-
facturer to facilitate the ordering process. In each
period (a month in the auto industry that motivated
this work), the sequence of events is as follows: the
retailer and the salesperson independently forecast
demand for the period. Next, the salesperson rec-
ommends an order quantity to the retailer. The sug-
gestion of the salesperson depends on various
factors including her social characteristics and
her compensation scheme. After learning the sales-
person’s recommendation, the retailer places an
order quantity based on his own forecast, the sales-
person’s recommendation, and his trust in the sales-
person. Finally, demand is realized, profits are
earned, the salesperson is compensated, the retailer
updates his trust in the salesperson and the process
repeats in the next period. We translate these
dynamics into a model below.
Figure 1 Left: A Typical Supply Chain Model with a Salesperson. Right: Supply Chain Model in This Article
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3.1. Forecasting Model
We model market demand in a given period as a
discrete random variable D ∈ {d, d + 1, d + 2, . . ., d},
where d and d are integers that denote the lower and
upper bounds on market demand, respectively. We
denote the cumulative probability distribution of
market demand by G(·) and the probability mass
function for this distribution by g(·).
As our focus is on the role of trust, we will assume
that demand is independent across periods. This
eliminates the need for time series forecasting meth-
ods. Note that having a time series element in the
forecasting process could be allowed within our
framework. But in order for the interesting issues of
trust to arise, the salesperson and retailer must have
access to at least some different information. Hence,
for simplicity, we focus only on the outcomes of the
forecasting processes of the salesperson and the retail-
er, rather than the processes themselves. As it does
not affect the results, we make the further simplifica-
tion that demand at any given period is uniformly
distributed on fd; dþ 1; . . .; dg.
We assume that the salesperson and the retailer
make their forecasts in each period independently.
We also assume that the salesperson knows the accu-
racy of the retailer’s demand forecast (i.e., she knows
the distribution of the retailer’s forecast), but the retai-
ler does not know the accuracy of the salesperson’s
forecast. We base this assumption on our observation
of the interaction between wholesale salespersons
and dealers (retailers) in the automotive supply chain.
Because of the nature of the salesperson’s job, she
tracks behavior of the dealer much more closely than
the dealer tracks the salesperson’s behavior. More-
over, although the dealer has no incentive to hide his
true forecast, the salesperson may have incentive to
exaggerate her forecast in an attempt to increase the
dealer’s order quantity. Hence, it is difficult for the
dealer to evaluate the salesperson’s true forecast accu-
racy.
Mathematically, we represent the forecast of the
retailer at a given period as a discrete random vari-
able Fr2fd; dþ 1; . . .; dg. To model the accuracy of the
retailer’s forecast, we assume that, given the actual
market demand in a period is D = d, the cumulative
conditional probability distribution of the retailer’s
forecast is denoted by Grðj dÞ and is given by a
discrete beta distribution with mode d and standard
deviation of rr. We use the beta distribution because it
has a very flexible shape distribution and is also ame-
nable to Bayesian updating. We denote the probabil-
ity mass function for the conditional distribution that
represents retailer’s forecasts by grðj dÞ. Hence, when
the retailer’s forecast at a given period is Fr = f r, the
retailer can use Bayes’ rule to compute the corre-
sponding market demand distribution as follows:
PrðD ¼ d j Fr ¼ f rÞ ¼ g
rðf rjdÞgðdÞPn1
i¼0 grðf r j dþ iÞgðdþ iÞ
; ð1Þ
where n = (d  d + 1) is the number of discrete val-
ues of demand.
Similarly, we model the forecast of the salesperson
at any given period as a discrete random variable
Fs2fd; dþ 1; . . .; dg. Given the actual demand at any
given period is D = d, then the cumulative condi-
tional distribution of the salesperson’s forecast is
denoted by Gsðj dÞ and is given by a discrete beta dis-
tribution with mode of d and standard deviation rs.
The probability mass function of this conditional dis-
tribution is given by gsðj dÞ. Hence, when the sales-
person’s forecast at any given period is Fs = f s, the
salesperson can compute the corresponding market
demand distribution as follows:
PrðD ¼ d j Fs ¼ f sÞ ¼ g
sðf sj dÞgðdÞPn1
i¼0 gsðf sj dþ iÞgðdþ iÞ
: ð2Þ
Note that since Gsðj dÞ and Grðj dÞ have the same
mode, rr and rs represent the accuracy of the
retailer’s and salesperson’s forecasts, respectively.
When rs < rr (when rs > rr), salesperson (retailer)
has a more accurate forecast than the retailer
(salesperson).
3.2. Profit Functions
We assume the wholesale and retail prices (i.e., pw
and pr) are pre-determined and fixed. We also
assume that the manufacturer has sufficient produc-
tion capacity to meet the retailer’s order so that
manufacturer shortages are not an issue. We assume
that any leftover inventory at the retailer level is
sold for a unit salvage value (represented by salvage
value hr) at the end of the period; and the retailer is
penalized for any unfulfilled demand at a unit
shortage cost of sr. Hence, the retailer profit at a
given period, when he orders q and demand turns
out to be d, is
Prðq; dÞ ¼ prminfd; qg  pwqþ hr½q dþ  sr½d qþ;
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Furthermore, when the retailer’s
order quantity is q, the manufacturer’s profit function is
given by
PmðqÞ ¼ ðpw  cÞq psðqÞ;
where ps(q) is the payment of the manufacturer to
the salesperson and c is the production cost. We
consider two different compensation schemes to the
salesperson:
1. Simple linear scheme: This compensation scheme
is based on a commission rate (a) and a base
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(constant) salary (b). The payment to the sales-
person when the retailer orders q is
psðqÞ ¼ aqþ b:
2. Convex compensation scheme: This payment is
similar to the linear compensation scheme,
except that it also includes a bonus commission
rate that applies after the salesperson has
reached a target level ~q. Specifically, the pay-
ment to the salesperson when the retailer
orders q is
psðqÞ ¼ a1qþ a2½q ~qþ þ b;
where a1 is the commission rate, for units sold
below (or equal to) the target level of ~q, a2(>a1)
is the bonus commission rate which is paid on
items sold above the target level of ~q, ~q is the
target level, and b is the constant salary.
The retailer’s optimal order quantity in a given per-
iod when his forecast of demand is f r is qr
 ðf rÞ and is
determined by the order quantity that maximizes the
retailer’s expected profit:
qr
 ðf rÞ ¼ argmax
q
E Prðq; dÞjFr ¼ f r½ 
¼ argmax
q
Xn1
i¼0
Prðq; dþ iÞ
PrðD ¼ dþ i j Fr ¼ f rÞ;
ð3Þ
where PrðD ¼ d j Fr ¼ f rÞ is given in Equation (1).
For the same scenario, the salesperson has a dif-
ferent optimal order quantity (i.e., which maximizes
the retailer’s expected profit), because her forecast of
demand is f s instead of f r, which is
qs
 ðf sÞ ¼ argmax
q
E Prðq; dÞ j Fs ¼ f s½ 
¼ argmax
q
Xn1
i¼0
Prðq; dþ iÞ
PrðD ¼ dþ i j Fs ¼ f sÞ;
ð4Þ
where PrðD ¼ d j Fs ¼ f sÞ is given in Equation (2).
Note that qs

and qr

depend on f s and f r, respec-
tively. Although qs

represents the salesperson’s best
estimate of the optimal order quantity, she may
have incentive to recommend another value to the
retailer. For example, the salesperson may be moti-
vated to suggest more than this optimal order quan-
tity to increase her commission-based compensation.
Hence, the salesperson’s recommended order quantity,
which we denote by Qs, may not be the same as this
optimal order quantity qs
 ðf sÞ.
The salesperson recommended order quantity Qs
may depend on various factors including the compen-
sation scheme of the salesperson and the salesper-
son’s social characteristics. We define the bias (or lie)
of the salesperson, b, as the difference between the
recommended order quantity of the salesperson and
her corresponding maximizer of the retailer’s profit.
That is,
b ¼ Qs  qs ðf sÞ: ð5Þ
3.3. Salesperson’s Preferences
Some papers have noted that in real world settings, in
addition to monetary payoff, other factors may affect
the behavior of people in social interactions. For
example, Charness and Rabin (2002) argued that peo-
ple are willing to sacrifice their own payoff to benefit
a low payoff player or to punish unfair players. To
incorporate such social characteristics in our model,
we use a similar approach to that of Charness and
Rabin (2002) and assume the utility function of the
salesperson when the retailer orders q and demand
turns out to be d is
Usðq; dÞ ¼ hpsðqÞ þ ð1 hÞq kPmðqÞ½
þ ð1 kÞPrðq; dÞ; ð6Þ
where ps, Πm, and Πr are the income of the salesper-
son, the profit of the manufacturer, and the profit of
the retailer, respectively; h ∈ [0,1] is the selfishness
parameter, which indicates the importance of the sales-
person’s own payoff relative to the profits of other
supply chain’s members; ρ ∈ [0,1] is a scaling factor
that makes the profit of the manufacture or retailer
comparable to that of the salesperson2; and k ∈ [0,1]
is a parameter, which we call the loyalty factor, that
indicates how much the salesperson cares about the
manufacturer’s profit vs. that of the retailer.
The parameters h and k characterize the attitude of
the salesperson toward the manufacturer and the
retailer. The lower the value of h, the more the sales-
person is willing to sacrifice her benefits to gain social
relationships. For example, if the manufacturer treats
the salesperson fairly then he would expect the
salesperson to be loyal and willing to sacrifice small
monetary payoffs to increase the manufacturer’s
profit in large amounts. This behavior corresponds to
small h and large k. By contrast, if the salesperson is
treated poorly by the manufacturer, but has a friendly
relationship with the retailer, then salesperson may
be willing to sacrifice her own payoff (i.e., h is small)
to benefit the retailer and/or punish the manufacturer
(i.e., k is small). Hence, these parameter values and
the compensation scheme of the salesperson result in
different behaviors from the salesperson and, conse-
quently, different supply chain profits.
To gain insight into the impact of the social pref-
erences of the salesperson on the performance of a
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supply chain, we consider the range of possible
behavior implied by Equation (6) by considering the
possible combination of h and k as follows:
 Selfish self-serving salesperson: This represents a
salesperson who only cares about her own
payoff. This “classic economics” type of sales-
person can be modeled by setting h = 1.
 Loyal self-serving salesperson: This represents a
salesperson who has some loyalty to the manu-
facturer. Therefore, although she cares about
her own payoff, she also cares about the manu-
facturer’s profit. This loyal type of salesperson
exhibits the reciprocal notion of fairness pro-
posed by Rabin (1993) and can be modeled by
setting h < 1 and k = 1.
 Fair self-serving salesperson: This represents a
salesperson who has a close relationship with
both the manufacturer and the retailer.
Although she cares about her own payoff, she
also cares about the profits of both the retailer
and the manufacturer. This fair type of sales-
person is consistent with the cooperative
notion of fairness analyzed by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and can be modeled by setting
h < 1 and 0 < k < 1.
 Compassionate self-serving salesperson: This repre-
sents a salesperson who has a close relationship
with the retailer. Hence, although she cares
about her own payoff, she also cares about the
retailer’s profit. This compassionate type of
salesperson matches the altruistic behavior
noted by Levine (1998) and can be modeled by
setting h < 1 and k = 0.
As benchmarks, we also consider the following two
types of salesperson:
 Honest: This type of salesperson never lies for
profit. Therefore, she only reports her forecast
without adjustment due to her own utility
function or other factors.
 Benevolent salesperson: This type of salesperson
only cares about the retailer’s payoff. We can
model this type of salesperson with h = 0 and
k = 0.
Note that the benevolent salesperson can be con-
ceptualized as a salesperson who is employed by the
retailer. Also note that under a commission-based
compensation scheme, the utility function of the loyal
salesperson is very similar to that of a selfish sales-
person. In our results, we find that the loyal, fair, and
selfish salespersons have very similar impacts on the
supply chain. Therefore, for readability, we have
omitted loyal and fair types of salesperson from
further consideration.
3.4. Modeling Trust
At each period t, the retailer is faced with two order
quantities, his own optimal order quantity qr

t and
salesperson’s recommended order quantity Qst . As
suggested by Stone (1961) and Clemen and Winkler
(1999), we assume that the retailer combines the two
order quantities using a simple weighted average:
Qrt ¼ ð1 wtÞqr

t þ wtQst ;
where wt ∈ [0, 1] is the weight allocated to the sales-
person’s recommended order quantity in period t.
Research has shown that information provided by
a trusted party is used more and is considered to
have greater value to the trustor (Moorman et al.
1992). Hence, the more the retailer trusts the sales-
person, the more weight he puts on her recommen-
dation. Because placing a greater weight on the
salesperson’s recommended order quantity greatly
impacts the retailer’s short-term profit, it is an act of
trust. Hence, we can view the weight on the sales-
person’s forecast as a measure of the retailer’s trust
in the salesperson.
After the retailer purchases order quantity Qrt , the
actual market demand dt is realized. The retailer com-
pares the relative accuracy of his forecast to that of
the salesperson and updates, wt+1, his weight on
salesperson’s recommendation in the next period.
Research has shown that individuals update trust in
one another based on experience. Mayer et al. (1995)
proposed that in organizational relationships, “out-
comes of trusting behaviors will lead to updating of
prior perceptions of the ability, benevolence and
integrity of the trustee.” Kramer (1999) suggested that
decision makers assess interaction histories to pro-
vide a basis for drawing inferences regarding their
trustworthiness and for making predictions about the
future behavior of others. Hence, whenever the sales-
person’s forecast is more accurate than the retailer’s,
we would expect the retailer’s perception of the sales-
person’s ability and integrity to increase. On the other
hand, whenever the salesperson’s forecast is less
accurate than that of the retailer, the retailer may
begin to doubt the honesty and/or competence of the
salesperson. In our model, this implies that the retail-
er adjusts his weight on the salesperson’s recommen-
dation based on her past forecasting accuracy.
We model the updating process using a simple
model in which, wt+1, the weight in period t + 1 is a
linear combination of the weight in period t and the
relative accuracy of the salesperson’s forecast:
wtþ1 ¼ wt þ d jdt  qrt j  jdt Qst j
 
;
where dt, q
r
t , and Q
s
t are the realized demand, optimal
order quantity of the retailer before considering the
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salesperson’s recommendation, and recommended
order quantity of the salesperson in period t, respec-
tively, and d is a sensitivity parameter that reflects the
speed with which the retailer gains or loses trust in
the salesperson. Note that jdt  qrt j represents how far
the actual demand at period t was from the order
quantity that the retailer was planning to make if he
did not take the salesperson’s recommendation into
account (i.e., if the retailer did not trust the salesper-
son at all). Similarly, jdt Qst j represents how far the
actual demand at period t would have been from
order quantity of the retailer, if the retailer completely
trusted the salesperson and ordered whatever quantity
salesperson suggested. If jdt  qrt j  jdt Qst j[ 0 (or
jdt  qrt j[ jdt Qst j), then, in period t, the retailer
could have better matched his order quantity with
demand if he had completely trusted the salesperson.
In this case, wt+1, the retailer’s trust in period t + 1
should increase (compared to that in period t). On the
other hand, jdt  qrt j\jdt Qst j implies that in period
t, the retailer could have better matched his order
quantity with demand if he had not trusted the
salesperson at all. This results in a lower trust in
period t + 1.
The literature on trust suggests that the rates of
gain or loss of trust may not be symmetric
(Mcknight and Chervany 1996). Typically, negative
experiences cause trust to be lost more quickly
than positive experiences cause it to be gained
back. To represent this, we model d via two sepa-
rate parameters, one for gains dg, and one for
losses dl, such that:
d ¼ dg; if jdt  q
r
t j  jdt Qst j
dl; if jdt  qrt j\jdt Qst j ,

and dg, dl  0. When dl/dg is large (and >1), it is
easier to gain the retailer’s trust than to lose it. We
label a retailer with this behavior as trusting. When
dl/dl is small (and <1), it is harder to gain the retail-
er’s trust than to lose it. We label a retailer with this
behavior as skeptical. Furthermore, dl/dg is a measure
of skepticism of the retailer, which we call the level
of skepticism. For modeling purposes, we will assume
that the salesperson knows dg and dl. In practice, the
salesperson could estimate the rates of trust gain
and loss by analyzing the actual order quantities
over time.
In addition to the trust updating mechanism, the
initial trust level (i.e., initial weight w1) reflects the
ability of the salesperson to influence retailer deci-
sions at the beginning of the relationship. This initial
weight can be affected by a variety of factors, includ-
ing the salesperson’s reputation (Ganesan 1994), first
impressions from initial interactions (McKnight et al.
1998), and the retailer’s emotional state and back-
ground (Gachter et al. 2004). To capture the evolution
of trust without adding another level of information
asymmetry, we assume that the initial weight is
known to both parties.
4. Model Formulation
To compute the salesperson’s optimal policy (i.e.,
what order quantities to recommend in each per-
iod), we make use of dynamic programming. As we
assume that excess inventory is sold at a reduced
price (a reasonable approximation of what happens
in an auto dealership), inventory from previous
periods does not carry over. We consider a finite
horizon with T periods, where T represents the
length of the relationship between the salesperson
and the retailer. Later in this article, we study the
effects of the length of the relationship on the sales-
person’s behavior and on supply chain perfor-
mance. The state space at period t includes the
current trust level wt and the salesperson’s forecast
f st for the current period demand. We can specify
the dynamic program as follows:
 Decision epochs are defined at the beginning
of every period right after the salesperson
makes her forecast of demand.
 State space S at period t includes states
ðwt; f st Þ, where f st 2fd; dþ 1; . . .; dg is the sales-
person’s demand forecast for period t, and
wt ∈ [0,1] is the trust of the retailer in salesper-
son at period t. Note that if the salesperson
knows the initial trust level, she can succes-
sively learn the trust of the retailer in the next
period by observing the realized demand and
finalized order quantity of the retailer in the
current period.
 Action space A includes all values of possible
bias that can be chosen by the salesperson. As
market demand is discrete and uniformly dis-
tributed on {d, d + 1, . . ., d}, we know that the
bias level b has to take values in increments of
1. Moreover, as discussed in section 3.1, since
market demand is bounded above and below,
we know that b is also bounded such that
b2fqs  d; qs  dþ 1; . . .; d qsg.
We denote the value function at period t for state
(w, f s) by Vt(w, f
s) which represents the total optimal
expected utility function of the salesperson from per-
iod t until the end of the time horizon (period t = T).
Moreover, we define v(w, f s, Qs) to be the component
of the salesperson’s total expected utility function that
corresponds to the salesperson’s current period
expected utility when her forecast is f s, her suggested
order quantity is Qs, and the retailer’s trust is w.
Therefore, we have:
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vðw; f s;QsÞ ¼
Xd
fr¼d
Xd
d¼d
PrðD ¼ d jFs ¼ f sÞgrðf r j dÞUs
ðð1 wÞqr ðf rÞ þ wQs; dÞ;
where Us(·,·) is given in Equation (6), and qr
 ðÞ is
given in Equation (3). We write the optimality equa-
tion of the salesperson for period t ∈ {1, 2, . . ., T  1}
as:
Vtðw; f sÞ ¼ max
Qst
(
vðw; f s;QstÞ
þ
Xd
d¼d
Xd
fr¼d
Xd
f¼d
PrðD ¼ d j Fs ¼ f sÞgrðf r j dÞ
 PrðFs ¼ fÞVtþ1ðWðw; d; f r; f s;QstÞ; fÞ
)
;
ð7Þ
where
Wðw; d; f r; f s;QstÞ ¼ wþ dðjd qr
 ðf rÞj  jdQst jÞ;
and qr
 ðÞ is given in Equation (3). Also,
PrðFs ¼ fÞ ¼
Xd
d¼d
gsðf j dÞgðdÞ:
We write the optimality equation of the salesperson
in the last period (where t = T) as:
VTðw; f sÞ ¼ max
Qs
T
fvðw; f s;QsTÞg: ð8Þ
5. Numerical Study
As is probably apparent from the above description,
analytical study of the above model is prohibitively
complicated. Therefore, in this section, we provide a
numerical study to gain some insights into the behav-
ior of the salesperson, trust of the retailer in the
salesperson, and supply chain performance when
salesperson and retailer have different social charac-
teristics and trust plays a role.
5.1. Design of Experiments
To gain insight into trust and its effect on supply
chain performance, we examined 43,200 sets of
parameters in our numerical study using the above
dynamic program. For any set of parameters that we
consider, we employ backward induction using Equa-
tions (7) and (8) to find the optimal strategy of the
salesperson, which includes the optimal order quan-
tity to recommend to the retailer Qts at any period of
time t = 1, . . ., T for any possible trajectory of system
states. That is, from Equations (7) and (8), we deter-
mine how much the salesperson should recommend
the retailer to order (Qst) at time t, given that at time
t, the forecast of the salesperson about demand is f st
and the retailer’s trust to the salesperson is wt. Next,
we generate streams of independent random numbers
for the demand dt, ∀t = 1,. . .,T, the retailer’s forecast
given the generated demand random variable f rt j dt,
and the salesperson’s forecast given the generated
demand random variable f st j dt. These random vari-
ables, combined with the optimal strategy of the sales-
person, determine the trajectory of the system states.
Based on the trajectory of the system, we can obtain
the retailer’s trust, retailer’s profit, and manufac-
turer’s profit. To obtain a confidence interval of 95%,
we conducted 2500 simulation replications for each
set of parameters. We describe the ranges of parame-
ters considered in the numerical study in the subsec-
tions below.
5.1.1. Salesperson’s Preferences. The utility func-
tion of the salesperson involves the following parame-
ters: selfishness parameter h, loyalty factor k, and
scaling factor ρ. We consider two different values for
the selfishness parameter h ∈ {0.5,1}. When h = 1, the
salesperson basically does not care about others in
the supply chain and her objective is to maximize the
sum of her own payoffs
PT
j¼1 p
s
j

. When h = 0.5, the
salesperson is willing to sacrifice her own payoff for
others in the supply chain (manufacturer or retailer
or both). In this case, when deciding upon her rec-
ommended order quantity to the retailer, the sales-
person maximizes a weighted sum of her own
payoff (with weight of 0.5) and the profits of other
parties (with total weight of 0.5). How the salesper-
son divides this weight between the profits of the
retailer and manufacturer depend on her loyalty
factor k. We consider k ∈ {0,0.5,1}, where k = 0
indicates that the salesperson cares about the
retailer’s profit but not the manufacturer’s. This can
be the case, for example, if the salesperson has been
mistreated by the manufacturer or has close social
connections with the retailer. By contrast, k = 1
corresponds to the case where the salesperson cares
about the manufacturer but not the retailer. For
example, if the manufacturer has a good working
relationship with the salesperson, the salesperson
may feel a sense of loyalty to the manufacturer.
Finally, k = 0.5 is the case where the salesperson is fair
and considers the welfare of both the manufacturer
and the retailer. For the scaling factor ρ, we picked a
single value that makes supply chain profit roughly
equal to the salesperson’s compensation under the
linear compensation scheme in the case demand is
known. Note that the exact value of ρ is not important;
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it is the combination of the values ρ, h, and k that
define different types of salesperson.
In addition to the above cases, as benchmarks, we
also considered an honest salesperson (who could be
motivated by a large disutility for lying) and a benev-
olent salesperson whose utility function can be
obtained by letting h = 0, k = 0.
Although we analyzed all of the above salesperson
types, we have removed results for the loyal and fair
salespersons from the study, as they are very similar
to the results for the selfish salesperson. Table 1 sum-
marizes the types of salespersons that we studied for
this article; the white columns represent the types for
which we report results.
5.1.2. SalespersonCompensationScheme. We used
two different compensation schemes for the salesper-
son: (i) a simple linear commission-based compensa-
tion scheme with commission rate a and (ii) a convex
compensation scheme in which the salesperson is
paid at a lower commission rate a1, for units below (or
equal to) the target level of ~q ¼ ðd dÞ=2, and she is
paid a bonus commission rate a2 (a2 > a1), for units
above the target level of ~q ¼ ðd dÞ=2.
We set a1 to be 4% of the supply chain’s profit mar-
gin pr  c and a2 to be 2a1. The reason for choosing
these parameters is that we want to make the sales-
person’s incentives change rapidly around the target
level to amplify the difference between the linear and
convex compensation scheme. For the linear model,
for each set of parameters, we choose a commission
rate, a, such that on average the manufacturer pays
the same percentage of his total profit to the salesper-
son under both the linear and convex compensation
schemes. This makes the two compensation schemes
comparable.
5.1.3. Other Parameters. In this section, we pres-
ent the values for the remaining parameters of the
model.
1. Salesperson’s forecast accuracy 1/rs: The sales-
person’s forecast accuracy is characterized by
standard deviation rs of her forecast distribu-
tion Gsðj dÞ. We considered values of the sales-
person’s normalized standard deviation to be
0.1, 0.15, and 0.25, where the salesperson’s nor-
malized standard deviation is rs=ðd dÞ.
2. Retailer’s forecast accuracy 1/rs: The retailer’s
forecast accuracy is characterized by the stan-
dard deviation rr of his forecast distribution
Grðj dÞ. We considered values of the retailer’s
normalized standard deviation to be 0.1, 0.15,
and 0.25, where the retailer’s normalized stan-
dard deviation is rr=ðd dÞ.
3. Retailer’s level of skepticism w: Define w = dl/dg,
this ratio represents the relative ease with
which the salesperson loses the retailer’s trust
as opposed to gaining it. A small ratio repre-
sents a trusting retailer, whereas a large ratio
represents a skeptical retailer. We considered
values 0.25, 1, and 4.
4. Cost ratio CR: Define pr  pw + sr as the cost of
underage and pw  sr as the cost of overage.
Cost of underage represents the loss to the
retailer due to a unit shortage, whereas cost of
overage represents the unit loss to the retailer
if he has leftover inventory. In the newsvendor
problem, the ratio of these two numbers is criti-
cal to obtain the optimal order quantity. We
define CR as the ratio of cost of overage over
cost of underage (i.e., CR = (pr  pw + sr)/(pw 
sr)). We considered three different values (by
changing pw) of CR = 2.2411, 1, and 0.44621.
These values correspond to z = Φ1(CR) = 0.5,
0, and 0.5, in a newsvendor problem with
normally distributed demand, when the retail-
er’s optimal order quantity is less than, equal to,
or more than average demand respectively.
Note that Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard nor-
mal distribution. In the remainder of the article,
we use z = 0.5, 0, and 0.5 to refer to these
cases.
5. Initial trust level w1: This measure represents
the initial level of trust the retailer puts in the
salesperson’s recommended order quantity.
We considered values 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1.
6. Length of the relationship T: This is the total
number of periods the salesperson will work
with the retailer. We considered values of 3, 6,
12, 24, 60, 120, 240, and 480. If periods repre-
sent months, then this covers a range from
3 months to 40 years.
Note that the retailer revises his trust level wt peri-
ods after he observes actual demand. As demand is
stochastic, to attain a minimum confidence interval of
95% on the trust levels wt for t = 1, 2, . . ., T, we con-
ducted 2500 simulation replications for each case.
In the remainder of this section, we present our
findings and discuss their implications for (i) the
factors that promote a salesperson to lie; (ii) the result-
ing level of trust; and (iii) the effect of the salesper-
son’s behavior on trust, on manufacturer’s profit, and
on retailer’s profit compared with those of a supply
chain without a salesperson.
Table 1 Different Types of Salespersons Studied
Parameters Honest Benevolent Compassionate Fair Loyal Selfish
h – 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1
k – 0 0 0.5 1 –
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5.1.4. Validating Trust Mechanism. Figure 2
illustrates the trust level of the retailer toward benev-
olent and selfish salespersons with various forecast-
ing accuracy levels and social characteristics. This
shows that, for a given level of forecasting accuracy, a
benevolent salesperson who looks out for the retail-
er’s best interest (depicted on the left) is trusted more
than a selfish salesperson who only maximizes her
own payoff (depicted on the right). This observation
confirms that our trust updating mechanism correctly
ranks the salesperson’s interests and assigns higher
trust to the salesperson with better intentions for
the retailer. Furthermore, we see that, for example, a
benevolent salesperson (depicted on the right) is
trusted more if she has a more accurate forecast than
the retailer. That is, the larger rs/rr, the higher the
retailer’s trust in the salesperson (especially in the
long term).
Finally, we find that, regardless of initial trust level,
trust of the retailer converges fairly smoothly over
time to a constant level, which depends on the type of
salesperson. This is because after some initial periods,
the effect of the initial condition diminishes and the
retailer learns the capability and intentions of the
salesperson. However, at the end of salesperson–
retailer relationship, trust of the retailer in a self-
serving salesperson declines as depicted in Figure 2
(right). This is because, at the end of the relationship,
there are no future benefits for the selfish salesperson
that motivate her to maintain the trust of the retailer.
Consequently, she focuses on her immediate (short-
term) payoff and inflates her recommended order
quantity to maximize her payoff. This results in the
retailer losing trust in the salesperson. These observa-
tions are indications that the proposed trust updating
mechanism reelects social realities.
5.2. Accurate Salesperson
A wholesale salesperson usually works with multiple
retailers. For example, in the automobile industry it
is very common that the manufacturer’s representa-
tive (the wholesale salesperson) sells cars to different
retailers within a region. Because she has access to
the overall sales forecast for the region, as well as
sales by all retailers in that region, the salesperson
often has better forecast accuracy than a single retail-
er who only sees his own market. In this section, we
consider such a salesperson whose forecast accuracy
is better than the retailer’s. We call her an accurate
salesperson.
Recall that we have assumed that the retailer does
not know whether the salesperson has a more accu-
rate forecast or not. In this situation, if the salesperson
communicates her true forecast and the retailer highly
trusts the salesperson, then overall supply chain
performance will improve. However, unless the sales-
person is fully dedicated to improving the profit of
the retailer or unless she is honest, she has incentive
to inflate her suggested order quantity to induce the
retailer to order more, and thus to increase her own
payoff. Therefore, the retailer cannot fully trust the
salesperson before he knows whether the salesperson
has good intentions (i.e., small h and k) and good
forecasting accuracy (i.e., rs is smaller than rr). The
amount that the salesperson inflates her suggested
order quantity depends on how she is paid, how self-
ish she is, how skeptical the retailer is, and the length
of her relationship with the retailer. In the following
section, we look at these different factors and their
impacts on the behavior of the salesperson and also
on supply chain profit.
5.2.1. Trust of the Retailer. The salesperson’s
forecasts can affect supply chain profits only if the
salesperson can affect the decisions of the retailer,
which only occurs when the retailer trusts the sales-
person. Thus, it is important to know under what cir-
cumstances the salesperson can gain the trust of the
retailer. In this section, we seek insight into this issue.
Specifically, we investigate the following questions:
(a) (b)
Figure 2 Trust of the Retailer in the Salesperson (Averaged Across 2500 Observations) with Different Relative Forecasting Accuracy (rs /rr) for
T = 24, z = 0.5, w = 1, w0 = 50%. Left: A Benevolent Salesperson (k = 0, h = 0). Right: A Selfish Salesperson (k = 1)
Ebrahim-Khanjari, Hopp, and Iravani: Trust and Information Sharing in Supply Chains
Production and Operations Management 21(3), pp. 444–464, © 2011 Production and Operations Management Society 455
(i) Do the salesperson’s social characteristics impact
retailer trust (and therefore supply chain perfor-
mance)? (ii) Can a self-serving salesperson whose
incentive is to increase her own payoff gain retailer’s
trust? If so, to what extent? (iii) How does the sales-
person compensation scheme of the salesperson affect
retailer trust of the salesperson?
5.2.1.1. Impact of Salesperson’s Social Characteristics:
When the salesperson’s forecast is more accurate than
that of the retailer, it is better from a supply chain
profit standpoint for the order quantity of the retailer
to be based on the salesperson’s forecast than on the
retailer’s forecast. This means that the retailer is better
off trusting the salesperson, provided that the sales-
person tells the truth. However, because the salesper-
son’s incentive is often not aligned with that of the
retailer or the supply chain, the salesperson may not
be trustworthy and thus the retailer should not (and
does not) completely trust the salesperson. The facts
that the salesperson may lie and the retailer does not
fully trust the salesperson can reduce supply chain
performance. The interesting question is whether
retailer trust of salespersons with different intentions
is strong enough to allow the salesperson’s more
accurate forecast to improve supply chain profits.
This issue is most critical for a selfish salesperson
who only cares about her own payoff, and is thus
willing to lie to the retailer (i.e., by inflating her rec-
ommended order quantity). Our numerical studies
lead to the following:
OBSERVATION 1. When the salesperson’s forecasting
accuracy is better than that of the retailer (rs < rr), the
retailer highly trusts the salesperson (even a selfish self-
serving one). Retailer trust of all types of selfish and com-
passionate salespersons is considerably larger when the
cost of overage is larger than the cost of underage than
when the cost of overage is smaller than the cost of
underage.
Figure 3 (left) depicts the retailer’s trust in different
types of salesperson during the retailer–salesperson
relationship when the cost of overage is larger than
the cost of underage (z = 0.5). In this figure, we can
observe that the retailer’s trust in different types of
self-serving salespersons (compassionate, or selfish
salespersons, numbered (3) to (6)) with the two differ-
ent compensation schemes (linear, solid lines, or con-
vex, shown with dashed lines) is above 75% in most
cases. Furthermore, the retailer’s trust in a compas-
sionate self-serving salesperson (numbered (3) with
the linear compensation scheme, and (4) with the con-
vex compensation scheme) is above 95%. This implies
that with a compassionate salesperson, the retailer
relies predominantly on the salesperson’s recommen-
dations rather than on his own forecasts.
Similarly, Figure 3 (right) illustrates the retailer’s
trust in different types of salesperson during the
retailer–salesperson relationship when the cost of
overage is smaller than the cost of underage (z = 0.5).
As Figure 3 shows, the retailer’s trust level is more
than 50% in most cases. Note that for a given type of
the salesperson with a given compensation scheme
(e.g., a compassionate salesperson with the convex
compensation scheme, numbered (3)), the trust of the
retailer is higher when the cost of overage is larger
than the cost of underage (Figure 3, left), compared to
when the cost of overage is smaller than the cost of
underage (Figure 3, right). That is, the salesperson is
more influential when the cost of overage is larger
than the cost of underage.
The reason that the retailer has high trust in the
salesperson (even a selfish accurate salesperson) is
that the forecast accuracy of the salesperson is better
than that of the retailer. Thus, the salesperson, by rec-
ommending a more accurate order size, can improve
trust, if she wants to. Although a selfish self-serving
salesperson wishes to inflate her recommended order
quantity as much as possible, she needs to retain the
(a) (b)
Figure 3 Trust of the Retailer in an Accurate Salesperson (Averaged Across 2500 Observations) for T = 24, w = 1, and w0 = 50%. Left: Cost of
Overage Is Larger than Cost of Underage (z = 0.5). Right: Cost of Overage Is Smaller than Cost of Underage (z = 0.5). Solid Line: Linear
Compensation Scheme. Dashed Line: Convex Compensation Scheme. (1) Honest Salesperson; (2) Benevolent Salesperson; (3) Compas-
sionate Self-Serving Salesperson (h = 0.5, and k = 0); (4) Selfish Self-Serving Salesperson (h = 1)
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trust of the retailer so that the retailer will consider
her input. Consequently, the salesperson does not
inflate her recommendation too much, resulting in
recommendations that benefit the retailer.
To understand why the retailer trusts the sales-
person more when the cost of overage is larger than
the cost of underage, consider an extreme case where
the cost of overage is much larger than the cost of
underage. In this case, the optimal order quantity of
the salesperson is smaller than her forecasted
demand. Hence, if she inflates her recommendation
from her optimal order quantity, her recommenda-
tion becomes closer to her forecast of demand, and
thus it becomes less likely that she loses trust of the
retailer. However, when the cost of overage is much
smaller than the cost of underage, the optimal order
quantity of the salesperson is larger than her fore-
casted demand. Hence, if she inflates her recom-
mendation from her optimal order quantity, her
recommendation deviates even further from her fore-
cast of demand, and thus it becomes more likely that
she will lose trust of the retailer. Thus, it is harder to
maintain trust of the retailer when the cost of overage
is smaller than the cost of underage as confirmed by
Figure 3.
Finally, as we noted earlier, the trust of the retailer
in the self-serving salesperson declines in the last few
periods, because there is no future relationship and
hence the salesperson does not need to maintain the
trust of the retailer. Thus, in the last few periods,
she exploits whatever trust level she has accumulated
up to that point.
5.2.1.2. Impact of Salesperson’s Compensation: Incen-
tives of a self-serving salesperson are influenced
by both her social characteristics (compassionate, or
selfish), which cannot be changed easily, and her
compensation scheme (e.g., linear or convex compen-
sation scheme), which is controlled by the manufac-
turer. Previously, we studied the effects of the
salesperson’s attitudes on the retailer’s trust. Here, we
examine the effects of compensation scheme on the
behavior of the salesperson and thereby retailer trust
in the salesperson. Based on our numerical studies,
we have:
OBSERVATION 2. When the salesperson’s forecasting
accuracy is better than the retailer’s (rs < rr), the type of
contract (linear or convex compensation scheme) does not
have a significant impact on the behavior (bias) of the
salesperson and trust of the retailer, except when the
salesperson is a compassionate self-serving salesperson. A
convex compensation scheme makes a compassionate self-
serving salesperson lie more about order quantity. When
the cost of overage is smaller than the cost of underage,
the salesperson is trusted less under the convex compensa-
tion scheme than under the linear compensation scheme.
In Figure 3 (right), we observe that trust in a com-
passionate self-serving salesperson with the linear
compensation scheme (solid line numbered (3)) is
considerably larger than trust in the same type of
salesperson with the convex compensation scheme
(dashed line numbered (3)). However, the compensa-
tion scheme does not affect the retailer’s trust of other
types of salespersons (e.g., compare a selfish salesper-
son with the linear compensation scheme (solid line
numbered (4)) and with the convex compensation
scheme (dashed line numbered (4)).
The intuition behind this observation is that under
a convex compensation scheme, the salesperson has
additional incentive to inflate her recommended
order quantity from her optimal order quantity when
the order quantity of the retailer is close to the target
level of her compensation. This factor becomes impor-
tant with a compassionate salesperson, because a
compassionate salesperson, unlike other types of self-
ish salesperson, has conflicting objectives. On one
hand, she wants to increase her own payoff (which
requires inflating her recommended order quantity),
and on the other hand, she does not want to let the
retailer lose profit (which means that she must not
inflate her recommended order quantity). When the
compensation scheme of the salesperson is convex
and the optimal order quantity of the salesperson is
close to the target level of her compensation, the rate at
which the salesperson’s payoff increases, suddenly
increases if she can convince the retailer to order more
than the target level of her compensation scheme,
whereas the rate at which the profit of the retailer
decreases does not make a sudden change. Hence, the
convex compensation scheme of the compassionate
salesperson has a large impact on her recommenda-
tions. However, selfish salespersons always try their
best to increase order quantity of the retailer, so
giving them additional incentives to increase their
recommendations does not make much difference.
Note that, as discussed earlier, when the cost of over-
age is larger than the cost of underage, the optimal
order quantity of the salesperson is smaller than her
forecasted demand. Hence, if she inflates her recom-
mendation from her optimal order quantity, her
recommendation becomes closer to her forecasted
demand, and thus it becomes less likely that she will
lose trust of the retailer.
5.2.2. Profits of the Supply Chain. In this section,
we study the effects of different factors, such as
skepticism, length of relationship, type of salesperson,
and compensation scheme of the salesperson, on prof-
its of the retailer, the manufacturer, and total supply
chain.
5.2.2.1. Impact of Retailer’s Skepticism and Salesperson’s
Social Characteristics: First, we study the effect of the
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retailer’s level of skepticism and the salesperson’s
attitudes (i.e., types) on the profits of the various
supply chain parties. We would like to know: (i)
whether the retailer’s skepticism has any effect on the
effectiveness of a salesperson; (ii) what type of sales-
person is beneficial to both the retailer and the manu-
facturer; and (iii) whether a benevolent salesperson
who only has the retailer’s profit in mind also benefits
the manufacturer. In this regard, we observe the fol-
lowing:
OBSERVATION 3. When the salesperson’s forecasting
accuracy is better than that of the retailer (rs < rr),
1. If the cost of overage is larger than the cost of
underage, a compassionate or a selfish salesperson
is beneficial to both parties only if the retailer is
skeptical (w is large). When the retailer is trusting
(w is small), only the manufacturer gains from a
compassionate or a selfish salesperson. However, a
benevolent or honest salesperson is beneficial to both
the manufacturer and the retailer (and thus the
total supply chain), regardless of the retailer’s skep-
ticism.
2. If the cost of overage is smaller than the cost of
underage and the length of salesperson-retailer is
long enough, a selfish salesperson does not have a
significant impact on the profit of the supply chain.
However, a compassionate, a benevolent, or honest
salesperson increases the profit of the retailer and
decreases the profit of the manufacturer.
From this observation, we can conclude that when
the length of relationship between the salesperson
and the retailer is long, regardless of the type of sales-
person and compensation scheme (linear or convex),
the manufacturer benefits from hiring the salesperson
only if the cost of overage is not much smaller than
the cost of underage.
Table 2 shows how the profit of the retailer (top)
and the manufacturer (bottom) changes as the retailer
becomes more skeptical when the salesperson is
benevolent (left) or selfish self-serving (right). In this
table, we observe that the benevolent salesperson has
a positive effect on profit of both the retailer (top) and
the manufacturer (bottom) when the cost of overage
is larger than the cost of underage. However, with
the same cost structure, the selfish self-serving sales-
person (right) always has a positive effect on the profit
of the manufacturer but has a negative effect on the
profit of the retailer when the retailer is trusting (w is
small). Interestingly, we observe that when the retailer
becomes more skeptical (w = 4), the selfish salesper-
son (depicted on the right) becomes beneficial to the
retailer as opposed to when the retailer is less skep-
tical (w = 0.25 or 1), in which case the selfish sales-
person has a negative effect on the retailer’s profit.
To explain why when the cost of overage is larger
than the cost of underage, both the retailer and the
manufacturer benefit from a benevolent or honest
salesperson, consider the extreme case where z is a
very small negative number (e.g., z < 3). Note that,
when the cost of overage is sufficiently larger than the
cost of underage, the optimal order quantity of the
retailer leads to an understock (i.e., less than his fore-
casted demand). However, as the salesperson’s fore-
casts are more accurate, her optimal order quantity is
to understock less than the retailer. In other words,
the optimal order quantity of the salesperson would
be, in expectation, greater than that of the retailer. In
this case, both a benevolent salesperson (who cares
for the retailer) and an honest salesperson (who never
lies) recommend an order quantity close to her opti-
mal order quantity (which is, in expectation, larger
than what the retailer was thinking to order). This
means that both the manufacturer (because of larger
order quantities) and the retailer (because of bet-
ter order quantities) benefit from either a benevolent
or an honest salesperson.
Next, we argue that skepticism of the retailer can be
beneficial to him. Although (expected value of) the
order quantity the retailer has in mind is too small,
self-serving salesperson has strong incentive to lie
and inflate her recommendation more than would be
beneficial to the retailer. If the retailer is too trusting, a
self-serving salesperson can easily inflate her recom-
mendation without fear of losing trust of the retailer.
By contrast, if the retailer is skeptical, it becomes hard
for the salesperson to gain trust of the retailer once
Table 2 Percent Increase in Profits of the Retailer and the Manufacturer
When a Benevolent or a Self-Serving Salesperson Is Hired with
a Linear Compensation Scheme When rs = 0.1 < rr = 0.25.
a,c, Benevolent Salesperson; b,d, Selfish Self-Serving
Salesperson; a,b, Increase in Retailer Profit; c,d, Increase in
Manufacturer Profit
Level of
skepticism (w)
Critical ratio (z )
0.5 0 0.5
(a)
4 9.04% 4.97% 2.66%
1 9.72% 5.47% 2.87%
0.25 10.14% 5.74% 3.00%
(b)
4 1.42% 1.49% 0.10%
1 7.05% 0.53% 0.23%
0.25 18.34% 3.83% 0.87%
(c)
4 3.86% 1.19% 6.33%
1 4.27% 1.22% 6.74%
0.25 4.50% 1.23% 6.97%
(d)
4 5.81% 1.42% 1.28%
1 8.53% 3.62% 0.10%
0.25 12.11% 6.53% 1.68%
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she loses it. Therefore, the salesperson is discouraged
from inflating her order recommendations too much,
and thus the retailer can also benefit.
Finally, we explain why, when the cost of overage
is sufficiently smaller than the cost of underage, the
benevolent or honest salesperson only can be benefi-
cial to the retailer and the self-serving salesperson
cannot have much impact on the supply chain. To
explain this, consider the extreme case when the cost
of overage is significantly smaller than the cost under-
age (e.g., z > 3). In this case, similar to the above argu-
ment, we can argue that the optimal order quantity of
the retailer is to overstock (stock more than his fore-
casted demand). However, as the salesperson’s fore-
casts are more accurate, the optimal order quantity of
the salesperson is to overstock less than the retailer. In
other words, the optimal order quantity of the sales-
person is, in expectation, smaller than that obtained
by the retailer. In this case, the benevolent salesperson
(who cares for the retailer) and the honest salesperson
(who never lies) will recommend an order quantity
close to what they think is optimal (which is in expec-
tation smaller than what the retailer has in mind).
This means that the manufacturer does not benefit
(because of smaller order quantities), whereas the
retailer (because of more accurate order quantities)
benefits from a benevolent or an honest salesperson.
With respect to total supply profit (i.e., the com-
bined profit of the retailer and the manufacturer), we
studied tables similar to Table 2 which, for the sake of
space, we have not included here. We observed that
when the cost of overage is significantly larger than
the cost of underage, the salesperson improves total
supply chain profit, regardless of the type of salesper-
son. However, when the cost of overage is signifi-
cantly smaller than the cost of underage, total supply
chain profit may or may not benefit from the salesper-
son. If the salesperson’s incentives are completely
aligned with increasing the retailer’s profit or the
manufacturer’s profit (e.g., the benevolent salesper-
son or the loyal salesperson), then the total supply
chain does not benefit from the salesperson as much
as it does with a compassionate salesperson. How-
ever, when the salesperson’s incentives are such that
she emphasizes profits of both the retailer and the
manufacturer (e.g., the compassionate salesperson),
the incentives of the salesperson are closely aligned
with total supply chain profit, and thus the supply
chain benefits from the salesperson. Note that even a
fair self-serving salesperson, who we defined to be
caring for the supply chain, is not as good for the sup-
ply chain as a compassionate salesperson, who we
defined to be a salesperson who equally cares about
her own payoff and the retailer’s profit. This is
because the fair salesperson’s compensation is
already such that she heavily favors the manufac-
turer’s profit and by not emphasizing the retailer’s
profit as much as a compassionate salesperson does,
the fair salesperson’s incentive is less aligned with the
total supply chain profit than that of a compassionate
salesperson.
The above observation suggests that the informa-
tion of a wholesale salesperson is best utilized, and
improves supply chain profit most, when the cost
structure is such that the retailer thinks of ordering
less than her forecasted demand. In this case, an accu-
rate wholesale salesperson encourages the retailer to
order an amount that is larger (on average) and closer
to what she thinks is optimal, which benefits both the
retailer and the manufacturer. Furthermore, the retail-
er also highly trusts the salesperson, which may yield
benefits in other aspects of the business relationship
(e.g., encouraging the retailer to make use of the sales-
person’s advice on sales promotions, product dis-
plays, or other matters).
Next, we study how the manufacturer’s and the
retailer’s profits change if a selfish salesperson is
replaced with an honest, compassionate, or benevo-
lent salesperson and the retailer’s level of skepticism
increases. We provide tables that quantify this change.
OBSERVATION 4. When the cost of overage is larger than
cost of underage, the retailer’s profit highly depends on
type of salesperson. With a benevolent type of salesperson,
the retailer achieves the highest profit compared to other
types of salespersons.
Table 3 demonstrates the percentage increase in the
retailer’s profit for a given type of salesperson, com-
pensation scheme of the salesperson, and skepticism
of the retailer when compared to a supply chain with
a selfish salesperson and a trusting retailer (with level
of skepticism of 0.25). For example, a retailer with
level of skepticism of 1 in a supply chain with a com-
passionate salesperson who is paid according to a
convex compensation scheme would gain 12.54%
more than a retailer with level of skepticism of 0.25 in
a supply chain with a selfish salesperson who is paid
according to a linear compensation scheme.
When the cost of overage is smaller than cost of
underage, the retailer’s profit highly depends on the
type of salesperson. This is because in that case, dif-
ferent types of salespersons have opposite objectives.
Specifically, when the cost of overage is smaller than
cost of underage, as discussed before, a benevolent
salesperson whose objective is to increase the profit
of the retailer recommends, on average, an order
quantity smaller than what the retailer would have
ordered before getting the salesperson’s recommen-
dation. This behavior of the benevolent salesperson
decreases the average profit of the manufacturer and
is completely opposite to what a selfish salesperson
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want to do. Therefore, the retailer’s profit highly
depends on the type of salesperson. On the other
hand, when the cost of overage is smaller than the
cost of underage, all types of salespersons would like,
on average, to increase the order quantity of the retail-
er to increase the profit of the retailer and manufac-
turer together. Therefore, when the cost of overage is
smaller than the cost of underage, the retailer’s profit
does not depend much on the type of salesperson.
OBSERVATION 5. With a selfish salesperson who is paid
according to a linear compensation scheme and a retailer
who is trusting, the manufacturer achieves the highest
profit compared to other types of salesperson and other
types of retailer.
Table 4 demonstrates how the profit of the manu-
facturer changes if the selfish salesperson with lin-
ear compensation scheme is replaced with other
types of salesperson (and/or with different compen-
sation schemes) and the level of skepticism of the
retailer increases. For example, if a selfish salesper-
son is replaced with a compassionate salesperson
and the retailer becomes more skeptical (such that
the level of skepticism increased from 0.25 to 4), the
manufacturer can lose as much as 4.14% percent of
profit.
5.2.2.2. Length of Relationship: In this section, we
study the effect of the length of relationship on profits
of the parties of the supply chain. We are interested in
how the length of the retailer–salesperson relationship
affects the retailer’s profit and the manufacturer’s
decision to hire a salesperson. Our experiments lead
to the following:
OBSERVATION 6. When the salesperson’s forecasting
accuracy is better than that of the retailer (rs < rr), inde-
pendent of cost structure, type of salesperson, and com-
pensation scheme of the salesperson (linear or convex),
the retailer and supply chain always benefit from longer
relationships (large T).
Note that as the length of relationship increases,
retaining trust of the retailer becomes more important
to the salesperson because when the length of rela-
tionship is longer, the salesperson can potentially
influence more decisions of the retailer toward her
own objective (whether it is increasing order quantity
of the retailer or it is increasing profit of the retailer).
Hence, the salesperson has incentive to suggest a less
biased order quantity to maintain retailer trust. Con-
sequently, the retailer and the supply chain gain more
from the salesperson’s input when the relationship is
long.
Table 3 Percent Increase in the Retailer’s Profit When Selfish Salesperson with Linear Compensation Scheme Is Replaced with Other Types of the
Salesperson (as Indicated) and the Retailer Becomes More Skeptical (from Level of Skepticism of 0.25 to 1 or 4) When
rs = 0.1 < rr = 0.25. The cost of overage is (a) larger than cost of underage (z = 0.5) and (b) smaller than cost of underage (z = 0.5)
Level of skepticism (w) Honest Benevolent
Compassionate Selfish
Linear Convex Linear Convex
(a)
0.25 14.48% 14.51% 14.50% 11.70% 0.00% 0.55%
1 14.25% 14.30% 14.28% 12.54% 5.79% 6.04%
4 13.92% 13.96% 13.95% 13.54% 10.01% 10.30%
(b)
0.25 1.92% 1.94% 1.22% 0.08% 0.00% 0.01%
1 1.86% 1.88% 1.33% 0.58% 0.31% 0.33%
4 1.75% 1.77% 1.37% 1.08% 0.49% 0.49%
Table 4 Percent Increase in the Manufacturer’s Profit When Selfish Salesperson with Linear Compensation Scheme Is Replaced with Other Types of
the Salesperson (as Indicated) and the Retailer Becomes More Skeptical (from Level of Skepticism of 0.25 to 1 or 4) When
rs = 0.1 < rr = 0.25. The cost of overage is (a) larger than cost of underage (z = 0.5) and (b) smaller than cost of underage (z = 0.5).
Level of skepticism (w) Honest Benevolent
Compassionate Selfish
Linear Convex Linear Convex
(a)
0.25 3.88% 3.85% 3.82% 2.78% 0.00% 0.08%
1 4.02% 3.96% 3.94% 3.29% 1.76% 1.89%
4 4.22% 4.17% 4.14% 3.99% 3.16% 3.22%
(b)
0.25 4.28% 4.33% 1.94% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00%
1 4.15% 4.21% 2.21% 1.02% 0.78% 0.80%
4 3.94% 4.01% 2.47% 2.09% 1.48% 1.48%
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5.2.2.3. Salesperson’s Compensation Scheme: Finally,
we investigate the effect of the compensation scheme
of the salesperson on the manufacturer’s profit. Spe-
cifically, we are interested in how the manufacturer
should pay (linear or convex compensation scheme)
different types of salespersons. Under the traditional
assumption that the salesperson’s incentive only
depends on monetary payoffs, it is easy to show that
the linear compensation scheme is better than the con-
vex compensation scheme (as defined in this article).
However, when social characteristics (types) of the
salesperson also affect the incentive of the salesper-
son, this is no longer the case. In particular, we
observe the following:
OBSERVATION 7. The compensation scheme of the sales-
person, linear or convex, does not have a large effect on
manufacturer (and retailer) profit unless the salesperson
is a compassionate self-serving salesperson. In that case,
the manufacturer is better off (and the retailer and supply
chain are worse off), if the manufacturer pays the sales-
person according to a convex compensation scheme rather
than a linear one, especially when the retailer is trusting
(w is small).
As discussed in section 5.2.1, with a convex com-
pensation scheme, the salesperson has additional
incentive to inflate her order quantity when the order
quantity of the retailer is close to the target level of
her compensation. With a compassionate salesperson,
who also cares for the profit of the retailer along with
her own payoff, it becomes crucial to the manufac-
turer that the salesperson place less emphasis on
retailer profit, especially when the retailer is thinking
of ordering more than his forecast of demand. When
the compensation scheme of the salesperson is convex
and the optimal order quantity of the salesperson is
close to the target level, the salesperson can increase
her own payoff rapidly without decreasing the retail-
er’s profit too much by inflating her optimal order
quantity a little bit. This causes the manufacturer to
benefit more from the salesperson. Other types of
salesperson already have large incentive to inflate
their order quantity and thus changing the compensa-
tion scheme does not make them perform better for
the manufacturer. When the retailer is trusting, the
salesperson can easily gain the trust of the retailer
and thus inflation of her suggested order quantity has
a less adverse effect on her future payoffs, and thus
she can inflate her recommendations more easily than
when the retailer is skeptical.
The above discussion suggests that the salesperson
lies more under a convex compensation scheme than
under a linear one. Therefore, the supply chain with a
convex compensation scheme benefits less from an
accurate salesperson forecast. This implies that the
supply chain as a whole is worse off if the salesperson
is paid with a convex compensation scheme than with
a linear one.
5.3. Inaccurate Salesperson
A wholesale salesperson performs various tasks, such
as market demand promotion, introducing new prod-
ucts to the retailer, administrative work related to
advertising, and many others. In cases where the
salesperson’s tasks are more focused on issues other
than forecasting demand, the salesperson’s forecast
accuracy may be less than the retailer’s. In the previ-
ous section, we restricted ourselves to the case where
the forecasting accuracy of the salesperson is better
than that of the retailer, which implies that relying on
the salesperson’s forecast can potentially improve the
profit of the supply chain. In this section, we study
the case where the salesperson’s forecasting accuracy
is not as good as the retailer’s. We are interested in
whether such a salesperson can improve the profit of
the manufacturer. To find out, we repeated our entire
numerical study for this case and we found that:
OBSERVATION 8. When the forecasting accuracy of the
retailer is better than the salesperson’s (rs > rr):
 No type of salesperson can maintain a high level of
retailer trust.
 In the long run, different types of salesperson (with
linear or convex compensation schemes) have simi-
lar effects on the supply chain parties. While the
effect on retailer profit is not substantial, there is a
negative effect on the manufacturer profit. Conse-
quently, the manufacturer is better off not to hire a
salesperson.
When the retailer has a more accurate forecast than
that of the salesperson, after some interactions, the
retailer will learn that the salesperson is not worthy of
trust (even if the salesperson has good intentions).
This implies that the salesperson cannot affect the
decisions of the retailer in the long run, and therefore
she cannot change the profit of the supply chain.
However, because the manufacturer must pay the
salesperson regardless of her influence, the manufac-
turer is better off not hiring the salesperson in the first
place.
We would like to emphasize that, in practice, apart
from influencing the retailer’s decisions, a wholesale
salesperson performs other tasks, including promot-
ing consumer demand of a manufacturer’s products,
building long-term relationships with the retailers,
and collecting market-demand information. The
above observation specifies that when the salesper-
son does not have more accurate market demand
information than the retailer, she cannot benefit the
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retailer by influencing the retailer’s ordering deci-
sions. However, she may still generate profit for the
manufacturer by influencing the supply chain in
other ways.
It may be interesting to look at the behavior of the
salesperson when the retailer does not find her trust-
worthy. In this regard, we observe that
OBSERVATION 9. The salesperson, even a benevolent one,
lies more when the retailer’s forecast is more accurate than
her own. When the cost of overage is smaller than the cost
of underage, the salesperson, on average, recommends an
order quantity that is less than what she thinks is optimal
for the retailer (even a self-serving salesperson).
To explain why the benevolent salesperson lies on
average, we follow the behavior of the salesperson
over time under different conditions, which leads us
to observe:
 When the trust of the retailer in the salesperson
is large, the benevolent salesperson does not lie
and suggests her optimal order quantity to the
retailer.
 When the trust of the retailer is very small
(almost zero), the salesperson lies and recom-
mends an order quantity close to her forecast
of demand (which is not her optimal order
quantity).
 When the trust of the retailer is at an interme-
diate level, the benevolent salesperson lies and
recommends an order quantity as far from her
forecast of demand as possible.
Note that at the end of the salesperson–retailer rela-
tionship, the benevolent salesperson never lies, as she
is not concerned with maintaining or gaining trust of
the retailer and thus she suggests whatever she thinks
is best for the retailer.
The intuition behind the first observed behavior is
that whenever the trust of the retailer is large, the
retailer relies mostly on the recommendation of the
salesperson. This means that it is mostly the salesper-
son who should decide how much the retailer should
order. Therefore, as the benevolent salesperson is con-
cerned about the retailer’s interest, her suggestion
should be her optimal order quantity, to maximize
the retailer’s profit, which is the same as the benevo-
lent salesperson’s utility function. However, as the
forecast accuracy of the salesperson is much worse
than that of the retailer, she cannot be as good as the
retailer and very soon the retailer loses trust in the
salesperson. Hence, we very rarely observe the first
behavior.
To explain the second observed behavior, we note
that when retailer trust of the salesperson is small, the
salesperson gives her best forecast of demand (which
is not her optimal order quantity) with the intent of
influencing the order quantity of the retailer a little
toward what she thinks demand would be. When the
cost of overage is sufficiently smaller than the cost of
underage, the optimal order quantity of the salesper-
son includes some safety stock on top of her fore-
casted demand. Hence, to suggest her best forecast of
demand, the salesperson lies and deflates her optimal
order quantity. Conversely, when the cost of overage
is sufficiently larger than the cost of underage, she
inflates her optimal order quantity.
Finally, to understand the third observed behavior,
we note that when the retailer’s trust is at an interme-
diate level, the salesperson lies as much as possible so
as to signal the retailer to reduce his reliance on the
salesperson’s forecast in future periods. That is, the
salesperson tries to keep retailer trust level positive
but small so that she can influence the order quantity
of the retailer a little toward what she thinks the
actual demand is.
As mentioned above, as the salesperson’s forecast
is worse than that of the retailer, she cannot maintain
high trust of the retailer. Hence, in most cases we
observe the second and the third behavior above. In
other words, the benevolent salesperson lies most of
the time.
6. Summary
While it is widely acknowledged in industry that rela-
tional factors play an important role in supply chain
performance and coordination, operations manage-
ment research has generally relegated such issues
to the category of “intangibles.” At best, the develop-
ment of trust has been modeled as something that
evolves in a “black box” and is therefore not directly
addressed. Furthermore, in most supply chain papers,
the issue of social characteristics of the various parties
is ignored. In this study, we have made a preliminary
step toward modeling trust and social characteristics
as dynamic and quantifiable components of supply
chain decisions. This has allowed us to examine the
evolution of trust and its impact on the supply chain
members’ behavior.
We find that even a benevolent salesperson who
focuses on retailer’s profit does not necessarily tell the
truth. In fact, she often tells white lies to increase
retailer profit, especially when her forecasting accu-
racy is inferior to that of the retailer. By contrast, a
self-serving salesperson manipulates the retailer to
order more stock by lying. Particularly when her fore-
casting skill is superior, she is successful in inducing
the retailer to order more while maintaining some
trust of the retailer. We also find that when the fore-
casting accuracy of the salesperson is worse than that
of the retailer and the cost structure is such that the
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cost of overage is smaller than the cost of underage,
a self-serving salesperson suggests less than what she
thinks is optimal for the retailer to order. In addition
to social characteristics, salesperson behavior is influ-
enced by the compensation scheme. We find that if
the salesperson is concerned about profit loss of the
retailer, a convex compensation scheme is better than
a linear compensation scheme from the perspective of
the manufacturer. This is in stark contrast with the
optimality of a linear compensation scheme for the
scenario without social characteristics. We also
observe that both the manufacturer and retailer can
benefit from hiring a salesperson with good forecast-
ing accuracy, particularly when the cost of underage
is smaller than the cost of overage.
In general, regardless of how manipulative a self-
serving salesperson is, time (i.e., duration of the rela-
tionship) has the power to reveal her competence (i.e.,
actual forecast ability). In a long-term relationship, a
self-serving salesperson is more cautious about the
trade-off of immediate gain (current order quantity)
and value of future cooperation (which affects future
orders). As a result, the retailer always gains from
longer relationships. Benevolent actions induce
greater trust in the salesperson–retailer relationship,
which may yield benefits in other aspects of the busi-
ness relationship and offset the small decrease in
commissions. This suggests that in long-term supply
chain relationships where trust is vital, job assign-
ments and salesforce incentives that promote a focus
on long-term relationships can benefit both the manu-
facturer and retailer in a supply chain.
In this article, we have focused on trust only in the
context of forecast sharing. To develop a more com-
prehensive understanding of the impact of trust on
other aspects of supply chain coordination, further
modeling work is needed. For instance, it would be
useful to consider a salesperson who performs multi-
ple tasks, possibly including demand promotion and
inventory allocation, in addition to forecast sharing,
and examine the impact of trust building on the sales-
person’s effectiveness in the other tasks. It would also
be interesting to investigate whether and how the
formal contract between the manufacturer and the
retailer should change as a function of the social char-
acteristics of the salesperson.
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Notes
1This is because with a linear compensation scheme, the
payment of the salesperson is a linear function of the
manufacturer’s profit and thus the objectives maximizing
manufacturer profit and salesperson compensation are
aligned.
2The reason we need this scale factor is because the retailer
and/or manufacturer’s profit is usually much larger than
that of a salesperson. By adding a scaling factor, we scale
down the profit of the retailer and manufacturer so that
they are roughly comparable to the salesperson’s compen-
sation. Note that the combination of the values ρ, h, and k
is what defines different types of salesperson. Equiva-
lently, one can eliminate the scaling factor ρ, and instead
consider large values for selfishness parameter h (close to
1). In either case, the results of our article are the same.
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